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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
DELBERT CHRIS CLARK,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.

WARDEN JOHN W. TURNER,

Case No.

10233

Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE
The appellant, Delbert Chris Clark, has appealed from
the denial of his petition for writ of Habeas Corpus by the
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On July 9, 1964, the appellant's petition for a writ of
habeas corpus was filed in the District Court. Counsel was
appointed to represent the petitioner and on August 21,
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1964, the State filed a motion to dismiss the appellant's
petition. On September 1, a hearing was held before the
Honorable A. H. Ellett and on September 3, 1964, the court
entered judgment dismissing the appellant's petition.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent submits that the decision of the trial
court should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent submits the following statement of facts:
The appellant filed his petition for writ of habeas
corpus alleging that he was presently confined in the Utah
State Prison pursuant to a judgment and commitment of
the Third District Court entered on the 2nd day of June,
1961 (R. 1). The petition alleged that the appellant was
convicted of the crime of second degree burglary and further of the crime of being an habitual criminal (R. 2). The
appellant further alleged that his habitual criminal conviction was based upon two previous felony convictions,
one in the State of Idaho for grand larceny in May, 1949
and one in the State of Utah for uttering an insufficient
funds check in February, 1961. The appellant alleged in
his petition that at the time of his conviction to the offense
of grand larceny in the State of Idaho, that he was denied
the assistance of counsel and that as a consequence, the
conviction could not be used as a basis for his Utah conviction of being an habitual criminal (R. 3). The evidence
disclosed at the hearing showed that the appellant is a 41
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year old convict confined in the Utah State Prison (T. 6).
He was originally sentenc~d to the Utah State Prison for
the crimes of second degree burglary and being an habitual
criminal, the sentences to run consecutively. Subsequently,
the conviction of being an habitual criminal was reommuted
by the Board of Pardons to run concurrently with the crime
of second degree burglary (T. 10).
Prior to the time the appellant was convicted of the
crime of grand larceny in the State of Idaho in 1949, he
had been convicted of two prior felonies in state and federal courts (T. 7, 8). At both times he was provided with
counsel. The court received into evidence a certified reopy
of the District Court Minutes .for the 16th day of May,
1949 for the Twelfth Judicial District, Bannock County,
State of Idaho. The minutes reflect:
"The defendant appeared in court at this time
for arraignment. Henry McQuade, Prosecuting Attorney, appeared for and on behalf of the State and
no one appearing for the defendant. The defendant informed the Court that his true name is Delbert Clark. The defendant informed the Court that
he didn't desire counsel to represent him. The Information was read to the defendant and the defendant waived the statutory time for entry of plea
was waived and the defendant entered a plea of
guilty as charged and asked that sentenree be passed
at this time.
"The Court ordered that the defendant be taken
by the Sheriff of Bannock County, and there held
until the arrival of a guard from the State, to be
taken by said guard to The State Penitentiary and
be there confined, at hard, labor~, for an INDE-
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TERMINATE Term not to exceed 14 years. Sentence to commence upon defendant's arrival at said
Penitentiary." (Defendant's Exhibit 1.)
A letter from Hugh C. McGuire, Jr., Prosecuting Attorney, Bannock County, Idaho dated August 7, 1964, was
received as part of defendant's Exhibit 1 which stated that
the District Judge who had originally taken the appellant's
plea in Idaho was now dead. The appellant testified with
respect to being advised of his right to have counsel (T. 6).
Were you at any time ever advised that
counsel was available even though you were not
able to pay for same?
"Q.

"A. Not to my knowledge. Now, that's ibeen
fifteen years ago, and to my knowledge 1 was never
even asked."
Appellant denied making the statement reflected in
the certified minutes of the Idaho District Court that he
waived counsel.
It appears that at no time during the appellant's confinement in the I~aho State Prison did he seek judicial relief from his conviction nor has he at any time attempted
to set aside the previous Idaho judgment ( T. 8, 9). Since
the appellant's conviction on the 'instant offenses, he has
filed two petitions for relief by habeas corpus which have
been passed upon by this court, Clark v. Turner, 14 U. 2d
235, 381 P. 2d 724 (1963); Clark v. Turner, 15 U. 2d 83,
387 P. 2d 557 -~1963). Neither of these petitions raised the
issue presented in the present petition.
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The trial court found as a matter of fact that when
the appellant appeared in the District Court of Bannock
County, Idaho for his arraignment, that he was informed
of his right to counsel pursuant to Idaho law and that he
advised the court that he didn't desire the appointment of
counsel (R. 16). In his oral conclusions at the time of the
hearing ( T. 14) , the trial judge stated :

"* * * I have to find, though, that he was
advised of counsel and that he waived it, that he
voluntarily waived it. It was his third loss, and I
believe he had knowledge of what was taking place
and, therefore, will here deny the writ of habeas
corpus * * *."
-Based upon the above evidence, it is submitted the trial
court correctly decided the issue.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE
APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS SINCE THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS A
FINDING THAT THE APPELLANT WAS NOT
DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT
THE TIME OF HIS CONVICTION OF THE
CRIME OF GRAND LARCENY IN THE STATE
OF IDAHO.
At the time of hearing on the appellant's petition, the
State took the position that as a matter of fact the case
should be determined against the appellant (T.: 4). The
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State felt it was unnecessary to decide whether or not the
decision of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963)
should be applied retroactively to vitiate convictions for
habitual criminal sentences based upon prior uncontested
convictions where counsel had not been provided. It is the
position of the respondent that the facts in the instant case
clearly support the trial court's finding that the appellant
waived his right to counsel.
The evidence in this regard shows that the official
records of the District Court of Idaho disclose that the
appellant advised the court that he did not desire the services of an attorney. Additionally, appellant's own testimony is less than positive of the position that he was denied counsel. At no time during the appellant's period
of incarceration in Idaho was an action brought to challenge the basis of his detention although, as will be seen
later, it appears that under Idaho law appellant would
have been entitled to his release in Idaho had he not been
given the opportunity to have the assistance of counsel.
Additionally, it should be noted that the appellant had two
previous felony convictions at the time of his appearance
before the Idaho court. In both of those instances, he had
the assistance of counsel. Undoubtedly appellant, by virtue of his experience, was acquainted with criminal
procedures and certainly must have been aware of his right
to counsel.
Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution, affirmatively grants a defendant charged with a crime, the
right to have counsel. :19-1512, Idaho Code Annotated, provides:
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"If the defendant appears .for arraignment
without counsel he must be informed by the court
that it is his right to have counsel before being
arraigned, and must be asked if he desires the aid
of counsel. If he desires and is unable to employ
counsel the court must assign counsel to defend
him.''
Further, 19-1513, Idaho Code Annotated, also provides:
"Whenever upon the trial of a person in the district court, upon an information or indictment, it
appears to the satisfaction of the court that the
accused is poor and unable to procure the services
of counsel, the court may appoint counsel to conduct the defense of the accused, for which serviee
such counsel must be paid out of the county treasury, upon order of the judge of the court, such sum
as the court may deem reasonable .for the services
rendered."
In State v. Montroy, 37 Ida. 684, 217 P. 611, the Idaho
Supreme Court expressed the opinion that it was the policy
of the State of Idaho to afford every defendant full opportunity to prepare his defense, including the right to counsel.
See also State v. Poglianich, 43 Ida. 409, 252 P. 177. The
Idaho Supreme Court in State V. Thurlow, 85 Ida. 96, 375
P. 2d 996, indicated that an accused must be informed of
the statutory right to be provided with counsel. See also
State v. Eikelberger, 70 Ida. 271, 215 P. 2d 996; Cobas v.
Clapp, 79 Idaho 419, 319 P. 2d 475; State v. Stafford, 26
Ida. 381, 143 P. 528. Consequently, it would appear that
it is standard practice in the State of Idaho to advise an
accused of his right to have the services of counsel, even
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though indigent, and to be provided with counsel if he desires. This practice, when compared to the minute entry
showing that the accused indicated he did not desire counsel, is sufficient to support a finding that the appellant
waived his right to counsel. Further, it is submitted that
the court record and official minutes of what transpired
creates a presumption of verity. In In re Chester, 52 Cal.
2d 87, 338 P. 2d 431, a writ of habeas corpus was brought
by the petitioner alleging a denial of the right of counsel.
Relying on the case of In re Connor, 16 Cal. 2d 701, 108 P.
2d 10, the court indicated that since the minute entry on
the magistrate's docket showed the petitioner had been informed of his right to counsel and waived the· same, that
there was no basis for the writ. Finally, since the appellant
has been convicted of five felonies, several of which are of
a nature which tend to impeach his veracity, the trial court
was well within its discretion in disclaiming the appellant's
attempt to impeach the official records of the Idaho court.
In United States v. LaVallee, 330 F. 2d 303 (2nd Cir.
1964), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that it
was permissible for a defendant to attack a state court's
conviction for being· an habitual criminal 'by filing a ·petition for habeas corpus in a federal court on the grounds
that one of the convictions used in determining habitual
criminality was without the assistance of counsel in violation of his constitutional rights and, therefore, the convietion for being an habitual criminal could be set aside for
lack of due process of law. In doing so, however, the court
pointed out that the mere allegation by a prisoner that he
was denied his right to counsel would not necessarily warrant his release. The court stated:
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"On remand, the District Courts will, of course,
hardly be compelled to accept the petitioners' allegations as true. Gideon has changed a rule of law,
but it has not abrogated the traditional responsibility of the District Courts accurately to determine
the factual patterns upon which that law is to be
applied. While issues of 'fundamental fairness' have
been removed from their consideration, the District
Courts will now be confronted with factual determinations as to whether each appellant was, in fact,
advised of his right to counsel, whether he waived
that right, and if not, and if indigent, whether he
was afforded court-appointed counsel. In resolving
such questions, there is no reason to suppose that
the Courts will not employ the methods and techniques which have long been familiar to our judicial
system. Thus, they . will undoubtedly consider the
appellant's credibility; available court records; the
prevailing practices of a particular state; any evidence which the State might choose to offer; and
all other relevant considerations. In short, though
on occasion difficult, there is no reason to believe
that the determinations required by Gideon will be
any more incapable of resolution than those required by Betts, and, indeed, the elimination of the
search .for 'fundamental fairness' would indicate
that the task of the District Courts has been greatly
simplified. No more than before will the Courts
be·-required to treat bare allegations of the denial
o~ .constitutional rights as tantamount to conclusive
proof that these rights were, in fact, denied."
·._Looking at the factors which the court determined
):elev~nt in LaVallee, it, is apparent that appellant is with,out a basis for relief on his claim. The appellant's credibil,~ty ·is open to dispute. Available court records are contrary
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to his position. The prevailing practices in the State of
Idaho are against his assertion. Other relevant considerations, including his age, experience and familiarity with
criminal process, lead to the conclusion that the appellant's
assertion must be rejected.
POINT II.
THE APPELLANT WOULD NOT BE ENTITLED TO RELEASE ON PETITION FOR
HABEAS CORPUS EVEN WERE HIS HABITUAL CRIMINAL CONVICTION INVALID
SINCE HE WAS CONVICTED FOR THE
CRIME OF SECOND DEGREE BURGLARY
WHICH CONVICTION IS VALID AND UNASSAILED BY THE APPELLANT.

In Point III of the appellant's brief, he contends that
if the trial court erred in determining that his habitual
criminal conviction should not be set aside, that he should
be released from confinement. The facts show that the
appellant was convicted of the crime of second degree burglary prior to his conviction for being an habitual criminal
in violation of 76-1-18, Utah Code Annotated 1953 (R. 1).
The sentences given by the court were to run consecutively.
Subsequently, the Board of Pardons on June 8, 1962 denied the appellant's petition for parole or termination, gave
him a rehearing date of June, 1972 and ordered that his
sentences be commuted to run concurrently (R. 7). The
Board in no way took any action as respects the sentence
for second degree burglary. The sentence was lawful when
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imposed and the Board of Pardons has not in any way commuted that sentence. Its sole action was to provide that
both sentences would run concurrently.
If one of two sentences is invalid, the petitioner is not
entitled to release so long as there is a valid sentence in
effect. Thus, in 15 Am. Jur., Criminal Law, Section 451, it
is stated:
"Unless otherwise provided by statute~ a defendant who pleads guilty or is convicted under an
indictment charging two distinct offenses may be
punished for both. * * *''
See also Wilkinson v. Harris, 109 U. 76, 163 P. 2d 1023
(1945) where the c~urt denied a writ of habeas corpus attacking one sentence where another sentence was valid and
outstanding. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Browning v. Crouse, 327 F. 2d 529 (lOth Cir. 1964), was
faced with a claim by a prisoner similar to the instant one.
The appellant there contended that his habitual criminal
sentence was improper as being in violation of his constitutional right to have the assistance of counsel. He was,
however., at the time of the petition, serving a valid sentence running concurrently with his habitual criminal sentence. The Tenth Circuit refused to grant relief noting:

"* * * The present detention under the
sentence on the robbery counts is valid. The sentence as an habitual criminal is separable. * * *"
Consequently, since the burglary conviction of the
appellant was separate from his habitual criminal conviction and since the sentences are distinct for each offense,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

should the habitual criminal conviction be set aside, the
appellant's release would have to await termination of his
sentence for burgla~y.
CONCLUSION
An examination of the record and contentions of the
appellant.discloses that he is not entitled to relief by habeas
corpus. This court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted,
A. PRATT KESLER,
· Attorney General,
RONALD N. BOYCE,
Chief Assistant
Attorney General,
State Capitol,
Salt Lake City, Utah,

Attorneys for Respondent.
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